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Articles
My Experiences with President–Attorney General
Relationships
Brian K. Landsberg*
As I flew to Washington in late November 1963 to join the Civil Rights
Division of the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) midway through what I thought
was President John F. Kennedy’s first term, I gave little thought to the different
roles of the President and the Attorney General—his brother, Robert F. Kennedy.
That world had changed by the time I stepped off the plane. A tragic assassination
had anointed Lyndon Johnson as President. Instead of working in the Kennedy
Administration, I stood on Pennsylvania Avenue near the Department of Justice
building and watched as the horse drawn caisson bearing President Kennedy’s
body passed by. Beyond the grief so many felt at the loss of President Kennedy—
whose energy and eloquence had attracted idealistic young lawyers to the
Department of Justice—I wondered what impact this son of the South would have
on civil rights enforcement. This was my introduction to the theme of this
symposium.
I worked under Presidents Lyndon B. Johnson, Richard Nixon, Gerald Ford,
Jimmy Carter, and Ronald Reagan, and returned for six months under President
Bill Clinton. Except for briefing Gerald Ford when he served in the House of
Representatives, I met none of these Presidents. I knew that Presidents generally
interacted with Attorneys General and, less often, with lower ranking presidential
appointees, but generally not with DOJ civil servants. But what was the nature of
that interaction? Over time, I saw Presidents influence the work of the Civil Rights
Division in a variety of ways. I set forth below some examples of those
interactions. They fall into several categories: setting priorities, setting litigation
policy, and seeking to influence positions in individual cases.
The Attorney General is the chief legal officer of the United States and is also
a member of the President’s cabinet. Congress created the Department of Justice
in 1870, placed the Attorney General in charge of it, and gave the Attorney General
supervision over litigation by the United States.1 In 1957, Congress authorized the
creation of the Civil Rights Division, which has since then enforced civil rights
responsibilities that a series of Civil Rights Acts conferred upon the Attorney
General.2
Daniel Meador, a Professor at the University of Virginia who served as an
Assistant Attorney General during the Carter Administration, studied the relation
between the President, the Attorney General, and the Department of Justice. His
* Brian K. Landsberg, Professor Emeritus, McGeorge School of Law. The author served in the Civil
Rights Division U.S. Department of Justice from 1964 to 1986 and for six months in 1993. Thanks to Lawrence
Levine for his helpful suggestions. Jade Wolansky provided helpful research assistance. Thanks also to Matt
Urban, Quentin Barbosa, and Tyler O’Connell of the University of the Pacific Law Review for their editing and
cite checking.
1. Act to Establish the Department of Justice, ch. 150, 16 Stat. 162 (1870).
2. Civil Rights Act of 1957, Pub. L. No. 85–315, 71 Stat. 634 (1957).
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1980 study points out that “the lawyering work in the Department of Justice will
be responsive, to an extent, to the results of the most recent presidential election.”3
He found the line between proper and improper political considerations hard to
draw.4 After all, the Constitution requires the President to “take Care that the Laws
be faithfully executed,” and the job of the Department of Justice is to enforce the
laws, which seems to parallel the President’s responsibility. A reporter and former
press aide at DOJ observed that the Attorney General and his principal assistants
sometimes “may be impaled upon a three-horned dilemma”: the purpose and intent
of Congressional legislation, Supreme Court rulings, and the policies of the
President.5
Presidents are most likely to act improperly when they interfere in individual
cases. Elliot Richardson, who served as Attorney General under President Nixon
until resigning during the famous “Saturday Night Massacre,” observed that
Presidents could legitimately express policy preferences regarding antitrust
enforcement, but “cannot without undermining the integrity with which the law is
enforced tell the legal officers of the government what to do or not to do in handling
a particular case.”6 The Massacre refers to the resignations of Attorney General
Richardson and Deputy Attorney General Ruckelshaus, who both resigned rather
than comply with President Nixon’s order to fire Watergate prosecutor Archibald
Cox for refusing to drop his subpoena of White House tape recordings. Acting
Attorney General Robert Bork then fired Cox.7 The use of presidential orders to
cover up crimes is so obviously improper that Nixon ultimately resigned to avoid
impeachment.
It is tempting to say that the President sets policy and the Attorney General
enforces law. But law and policy cannot be so cleanly distinguished from one
another. Race discrimination in public schools highlighted this difficulty during
the Johnson, Nixon, Ford, Carter, and Reagan presidencies.
In 1963, the Department of Justice had no formal authority to address racial
segregation of the public schools, but President Kennedy’s predecessors had
turned to the Attorney General to file amicus curiae briefs in Brown v. Board of
Education and to protect federal court orders in Little Rock.8 President Johnson
successfully lobbied Congress to enact the 1964 Civil Rights Act, which gave the
Attorney General some authority to bring or intervene in school desegregation

3. DANIEL JOHN MEADOR, THE PRESIDENT, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, AND THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
28 (Univ. of Virginia 1st ed. 1980).
4. Id. at 29.
5. LUTHER A. HUSTON, THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 3 (1967).
6. MEADOR, supra note 3, at 30.
7. KATHARINE GRAHAM, PERSONAL HISTORY 491 (1997).
8. See, e.g., Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae at 2, Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483
(1954), 1952 WL 82045; Press Release, Dwight D. Eisenhower, Address on Little Rock (Sep. 24, 1957) (on file
with the University of the Pacific Law Review).
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cases.9 And he met with the intransigent Governor George Wallace of Alabama,
resulting in this interchange:
President Johnson: “Why don’t you just desegregate all your schools?”
George Wallace: “Oh, Mr. President, I can’t do that. You know, the
schools have got school boards. They’re locally run. I haven’t got the
political power to do that.”
President

Johnson:

“Don’t

you shit

me,

George

Wallace.”10

The following year, acting Attorney General Ramsey Clark supported a
statewide school desegregation order against Wallace. The President then
nominated Clark to become Attorney General in 1967; Clark’s father—Justice
Thomas Clark—immediately resigned from the Supreme Court, creating a vacancy
that President Johnson used to place Thurgood Marshall on the Court. We don’t
know whether Johnson ordered the DOJ to seek statewide desegregation of
Alabama, but we do know that the Attorney General’s commitment of substantial
litigation resources to the case carried out the President’s policy. And we also
know some of Johnson’s top White House advisors were intimately involved with
school desegregation policy at a granular level.11 Clark initiated a Civil Rights
Division effort to bring urban Northern school desegregation cases. The Kennedy–
Johnson years were marked by a President and Attorney General in sync with one
another on school desegregation policy, so that major litigation decisions reflected
that policy consensus.
The Nixon Administration brought a seeming schism. President Nixon’s
Attorney General—John Mitchell—had been Nixon’s campaign manager, just as
President Kennedy’s Attorney General—his brother, Robert F. Kennedy—had
been Kennedy’s campaign manager. Mitchell’s Civil Rights Division initially
continued litigating motions seeking desegregation in accordance with the
Supreme Court’s ruling in Green v. County School Board.12 One high-ranking
holdover from the Johnson Administration said of the first month, “I haven’t seen
even minor, let alone major, shifts in civil-rights policies here.”13 High-ranking
White House aides discussed school desegregation policy, with one concluding
that DOJ should work to complete the process.14 However, in mid-August, the

9. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241.
10. JON MEACHAM, THE SOUL OF AMERICA: THE BATTLE FOR OUR BETTER ANGELS 239 (Random House
1st ed. 2018).
11. See, e.g., F. Peter Libassi, Special Assistant to the Secretary for Civil Rights, to Douglass Cater, Joseph
A. Califano, & John Doar (Apr. 6, 1967) (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review).
12. 391 U.S. 430, 441–42 (1968).
13. RICHARD HARRIS, JUSTICE: THE CRISIS OF LAW, ORDER, AND FREEDOM IN AMERICA 193 (1970)
(quoting Nathan Lewin).
14. Memorandum from Lamar Alexander, to Bryce Harlow, Exec. Assistant to President Nixon, on A New
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Nixon Administration abruptly reversed course in Mississippi school
desegregation cases. In a breach of normal protocol, the Secretary of Health,
Education, and Welfare (“HEW”) (rather than the lawyers for the government) sent
a letter to the Chief Judge of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals asking the court to
delay school desegregation in 23 Mississippi school districts to avoid “chaos,
confusion and a catastrophic educational setback to the 135,700 children, black
and white alike” in those districts.15 Although the Department of Justice had earlier
urged prompt relief, noting that no White child attended a formerly all-Black
school and that segregation exceeded what was permissible under HEW’s
guidelines, it immediately filed a motion based on the HEW secretary’s letter. The
motion asked the court to delay desegregation in those districts, contradicting the
division’s prior position urging the court to order implementation of HEW plans
in those districts.16 When confronted with rumors that the Nixon Administration
had insisted on this course of action in return for a Mississippi Senator’s support
of a defense-spending bill, Assistant Attorney General Jerris Leonard conceded
that the delay motion had been politically motivated.17 Lawyers in DOJ’s Civil
Rights Division publicly protested, and private plaintiffs took the case to the
Supreme Court, which promptly and unanimously ruled that the defendant school
districts must “immediately” begin to operate a unitary school system.18 Asked at
a press conference what his school desegregation policy was in light of the court’s
decision, Nixon responded, “To carry out what the Supreme Court has laid
down.”19
The Mississippi desegregation debacle can be viewed as a cautionary tale, a
warning that political interference with law enforcement may backfire. From the
President’s perspective, perhaps the reprimand from the Supreme Court was a
small price to pay for whatever political advantage the delay may have bought.
From the perspective of Southern segregationists who sought to stop
desegregation, the episode had the opposite result, as Nixon embarked on an
ambitious program to complete desegregation, thereby putting the issue behind
him before the next election.20 From the standpoint of the Department of Justice,
the delay request had seriously undermined its credibility with the courts, and it
took several years to restore credibility. This and other actions led one scholar to
label Mitchell an Attorney General with “no respect for the law.” By way of
School Desegregation Policy (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review).
15. LEON PANETTA & PETER GALL, BRING US TOGETHER 253–56 (1971) (quoting letter from Robert Finch
to judges of the Fifth Circuit, August 19, 1969).
16. Id.; see also Alexander v. Holmes, 396 U.S. 1218, 1218–19, 1221–22 (1969).
17. HARRIS, supra note 13, at 219–20; see also JAMES W. LOEWEN, SCHOOL DESEGREGATION IN
MISSISSIPPI 55 (1973); BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE, VOL. 3: THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION 243
(Belknap Press 1st ed. 2014).
18. Alexander v. Holmes Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 396 U.S. 19, 20 (1969).
19. Richard Nixon, The President’s News Conference (Dec. 8, 1969) (on file with the University of the
Pacific Law Review); BOB WOODWARD & SCOTT ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN 56 (1979) (showing Nixon was
reportedly “content,” because the end of further delay “was the Court’s fault, not his”).
20. See ACKERMAN, supra note 17, at 247–52.
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contrast, she called Edward Levi “the Neutral Attorney General” and Robert
Kennedy “the Advocate Attorney General.”21 Lack of credibility compromises the
effectiveness of any lawyer, including the Attorney General. If the President wants
the Attorney General to advance administration policy objectives, the President
must avoid interfering in individual cases and think twice before ordering DOJ to
reverse prior litigation positions.
Gerald Ford had shown great interest in the issue of court-ordered school
busing in desegregation cases when he was the Majority Leader in the House of
Representatives. Ford, a Representative from Grand Rapids, Michigan, asked to
be briefed on the law, and so Assistant Attorney General J. Stanley Pottinger sent
me to talk with the Congressman about busing. I explained to him that the courts
ordered busing only where necessary to overcome the effects of past
discrimination, and that although the Supreme Court case endorsing busing arose
in the South, it applied as well to Northern school systems if a court found de jure
segregation. By the time Ford ascended the presidency after Nixon resigned from
the office, school desegregation had become a hot issue in some northern school
systems. A trial court found a pattern of pervasive de jure segregation in Boston,
and a court of appeals affirmed the resultant busing order. The city was in an
uproar, inflamed by rhetoric of the school board president. The board asked the
Supreme Court to hear the case. However, the board’s petition failed to show how
the lower courts had done anything requiring Supreme Court review.
The board asked Solicitor General Robert Bork for help, and Bork decided to
file a brief supporting the school board’s petition, in order to promote President
Ford’s position of opposition to busing. Civil rights groups lobbied against the
filing. As the Chief of the Appellate Section in the Civil Rights Division, I
forwarded to Pottinger a strong recommendation against filing. Pottinger—having
failed to persuade Bork not to file—sought a meeting with Attorney General
Edward Levi. Ford had brought Levi to the Department of Justice to restore its
reputation for evenhanded enforcement of the law, which had been tarnished by
the Watergate scandal and the conviction of Attorneys General Mitchell and
Kleindienst of related crimes. Justice Antonin Scalia worked for the Levi Justice
Department. He credited Levi with bringing “the department through its worst
years,” noting that “there couldn’t have been a tougher job in Washington where
the whole executive branch was in disarray after Watergate.”22 By the time Levi
convened a meeting about the Boston case, Bork had printed up copies of a brief
because of a filing deadline. Attorney General Levi faced a choice: file a legally
thin brief that advanced the President’s anti-busing policy or overrule his Solicitor
General. The discussions were heated. In the end, Levi sided with the view of the
Civil Rights Division and decided the brief should not be filed. Levi had—
21. NANCY V. BAKER, CONFLICTING LOYALTIES: LAW AND POLITICS IN THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S
OFFICE, 1789–1990, at 82, 122, 140 (1992).
22. Neil A Lewis, Edward H. Levi, Attorney General Credited with Restoring Order After Watergate, Dies
at 88, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 2000, at C25.
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according to one scholar—met with President Ford about the case three times,
informing the President on the third occasion that he had decided not to approve
the filing, because filing would “reward those who resisted court orders.”23 Levi
insisted that although “there were discussions with the President,” the “Department
made its own determination.”24
President Carter chose his long-time hunting companion—Griffin Bell—as his
Attorney General. Succeeding Edward Levi, Bell bowed toward the independence
of his office from the President. He explained, “I always figured I was wearing
three or four hats. I had a heavy responsibility to the Congress. The President was
my boss, but in a sense, the American people went in there too.”25 He insisted that
the Department of Justice would operate “on a non-political, non-partisan basis”
and was to be a “neutral zone.” He required that all communications from the
White House be funneled through him to spare career staff and even presidential
appointees from improper interference by the President’s staff.26 So when the
Supreme Court agreed to hear a case challenging affirmative action at the
University of California, Davis, Medical School, we assumed that decisions
whether to file a brief amicus curiae and what to say in the brief would be made
free from political pressure from the president. But just as Solicitor General Bork
had been besieged from all sides as he decided whether to participate in the Boston
school desegregation case, so also his successor—Solicitor General Wade H.
McCree—faced pressures as he decided what course to take in Regents of the
University of California v. Bakke.27
When the Court decided to hear the case, “the Department promptly solicited
the view of the many federal agencies whose programs and enforcement
responsibilities might be affected.”28 “The relevant legal authority was sketchy and
clearly did not dictate any one choice. The choice would necessarily be influenced
by one’s views on matters of governmental and social policy.”29 My colleague
Jessica Silver and I recommended that Assistant Attorney General Drew Days III
urge the Solicitor General to file a brief supporting affirmative action. Days agreed
and sent our recommendation to McCree. Days, McCree—and his assistants, Larry

23. LAWRENCE J. MCANDREWS, THE ERA OF EDUCATION: THE PRESIDENTS AND THE SCHOOLS, 1965–
2001, at 77 (2006). Another version has Bork becoming convinced not to file the brief. LINCOLN CAPLAN, THE
TENTH JUSTICE: THE SOLICITOR GENERAL AND THE RULE OF LAW 39 (1987).
24. MEADOR, supra note 3, at 85.
25. Griffin Bell Oral History Transcript, UNIV. OF VA. MILLER CTR., https://millercenter.org/thepresidency/presidential-oral-histories/griffin-bell-oral-history (last visited Mar. 11, 2021) (on file with the
University of the Pacific Law Review) (noting that the interview took place on March 23, 1988) [hereinafter Bell
Oral History].
26. Daniel J. Meador, Griffin Bell at the Intersection of Law and Politics: The Department of Justice,
1977–1979, 24 J.L. POL. 529, 532–533 (2008).
27. See generally Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 268–72 (1978); see also, Howard Ball, The Bakke Case:
Race, Education, & Affirmative Action, 70-77.
28. Motion for Leave to File a Supplemental Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae and
Supplemental Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
29. MEADOR, supra note 3, at 36.
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Wallace and Frank Easterbrook—as well as Silver and I, met with the medical
school’s lawyers, former Solicitor General Archibald Cox, and UC Berkeley Law
Professor Paul Mishkin, who urged that the government file a brief strongly
supporting the school’s affirmative action plan. However, when pressed to
articulate their constitutional argument, the lawyers were surprisingly unprepared.
Wallace and Easterbrook convinced McCree that while we should file in the case,
the UC Davis Medical School’s affirmative action plan went too far. The School
took in a class of 100 each year and set aside 16 places in the class for “Blacks,
Chicanos, Asians, and American Indians.”30 The Solicitor General’s office and the
Civil Rights Division negotiated on the contents of our brief, but McCree had the
final say on what we filed. Since the issue of affirmative action affected other parts
of the government, they received a copy of the draft brief. Attorney General Bell
took the brief to President Carter, who thought “it was not well done.”31
The draft was promptly leaked to the press, and a firestorm of protest from
civil rights groups ensued, and some cabinet members complained to the President.
Bell later recounted, “The Bakke case was one of the worst, where they all got into
it.”32 As we understood what happened next, the President spoke with the Attorney
General, who spoke with McCree. While Carter’s Chief Domestic Policy Advisor
says that he and the White House Counsel wrote a memo “to form the basis for a
new brief,”33 we never saw the memo. We were simply told to consider the
objections to the brief and work out the differences between the Civil Rights
Division and Solicitor General’s office. However, we were never told that the
President insisted on any particular argument or outcome. For several days and
nights, McCree, Days, Wallace, Easterbrook, Silver, and I holed up in the Civil
Rights Division conference room hammering out a brief. We literally went through
the draft one sentence at a time. We filed a brief that pleased no one but that proved
influential in the final outcome of the case. We argued that the use of raceconsciousness in evaluating applicants was constitutional but that the Court should
send the case back to the lower courts to determine how the School accounted for
race and whether the program’s objectives could be served equally well by less
burdensome methods. The Medical School and the Congressional Black Caucus
filed briefs arguing that the Court should not seek further information but should
approve the affirmative action plan.34 The Court issued a split decision, striking
down the affirmative action plan because White applicants were foreclosed from

30. Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 265 (1978).
31. STUART E. EIZENSTAT, PRESIDENT CARTER: THE WHITE HOUSE YEARS 865 (2018).
32. Bell Oral History, supra note 25; CAPLAN, supra note 23, at 39–48 (recounting the story of the
government and the Bakke case); GRIFFIN B. BELL & RONALD J. OSTROW, TAKING CARE OF THE LAW 28–32
(1982); TIMOTHY J. O’NEILL, BAKKE AND THE POLITICS OF EQUALITY: FRIENDS AND FOES IN THE CLASSROOM
OF LITIGATION 179–91 (1985).
33. EIZENSTAT, supra note 31, at 866.
34. See generally Brief for Petitioner, Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978), 1977 WL 187977; see also
Brief in Reply of Members of the Congressional Black Caucus, Members of the Congress of the United States,
to Brief of the United States, Amici Curiae, Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978), 1977 WL 204785.
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competing for the sixteen positions; the Court also agreed with our position,
however, that race could be considered in pursuit of legitimate educational
objectives. The Court said that the pursuit of diversity was such an objective.
During a discussion of the proper relation between the President and Attorney
General, Levi commented, “it might be useful, looking at the Bakke case, to ask
whether when you have a problem of affirmative action, or reverse discrimination,
or quotas, is that solely a legal question.” He answered his own question: “Of
course the law itself involves many policy considerations.” The problem, as he saw
it, came from “people who are looking only at the policy aspects or result aspects
which they envision mainly in terms of slogans which may not . . . usefully guide
the legal issues . . . .”35
Ronald Reagan began his presidency with a strong deregulation push that
reached to a pending Supreme Court case. As a candidate, Reagan had argued
against the Internal Revenue Service rule denying tax-exempt status to private
schools that discriminate based on race. Bob Jones University had lost a challenge
to the IRS rule in the lower courts and had asked the Supreme Court to hear the
case. When the Court agreed to hear Bob Jones’ challenge to the lower court
rulings, a Mississippi member of Congress urged President Reagan to repudiate
the government’s support for the IRS rule. Reagan agreed, and Attorney General
William French Smith—Reagan’s friend and personal lawyer—overruled the
acting Solicitor General Lawrence Wallace, who had told the Court that the lower
courts should be upheld. Wallace dutifully filed a brief, but with this unusual
footnote: “This brief sets forth the position of the United States on both questions
presented. The Acting Solicitor General fully subscribes to the position set forth
on question number two, only.” More than half the lawyers in the Civil Rights
Division signed a letter protesting the change in position.36
The change in the government’s position denied the Treasury Department a
defense of its regulation. The Court then resorted to the unusual device of
appointing an amicus curiae to defend the government’s prior position. The Court
ultimately upheld the regulation and ruled against the Reagan Administration.37
The episode stained the Attorney General’s reputation in the Court. Wallace stayed
true to his high standards while presenting the administration’s views, but he found
himself sidelined from all civil rights cases during the remainder of the Reagan
Administration.
Sherrilyn Ifill, the president and director-counsel of the NAACP Legal
Defense and Educational Fund, has suggested “that the presumption that the
Department of Justice will maintain an appropriate measure of independence from

35. MEADOR, supra note 3, at 84.
36. Edward J. Boyer, William French Smith, 73, Dies; Reagan Adviser and Atty. Gen., L.A. TIMES (Oct.
30, 1990), https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1990-10-30-me-3410-story.html (on file with the
University of the Pacific Law Review).
37. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 605 (1983); CAPLAN, supra note 23, at 5–64
(describing in detail the Bob Jones University case).
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the White House can simply no longer be left to the personal ethics of individual
attorneys general.” She urged, “We need a revision of the rules that govern recusal
by lawyers in the Department of Justice.” Daniel Meador had noted in 1980 “it is
misleading to say that ‘politics’ should play no part in the legal work of the
Attorney General and the Department of Justice. At the same time, it is equally
true that certain kinds of political considerations are inappropriate in the
administration of justice.”38 However, no new rules are needed to inform the
President and Attorney General of the obvious: that they may not cover up criminal
behavior or obstruct criminal investigations.
The Supreme Court has endorsed “the wisdom of requiring the chief law
officer of the Government to exercise a sound discretion in designating the
inquiries to enforce which he shall feel justified in invoking the action of the court
. . . .”39 Exercise of sound discretion respecting law enforcement requires
understanding of the law, the facts, and policy. Presidents will normally lack
command of the law and the facts governing individual cases even if they have
command of policy. On the other hand, Attorneys General are trained in the law,
and Department of Justice lawyers routinely analyze law and facts of individual
cases. The specialized roles of President and Attorney General explain why
Presidents should confine themselves to overall policy and abstain from interfering
in individual cases. And adherence to the rule of law requires the President to
abstain from politically motivated interference, such as what occurred in the
Mississippi school desegregation cases in 1969.
In the end, we may have to rely on both the President and the Attorney General
to exercise sound discretion in carrying out their duties. Perhaps some general
standards could be helpful, but the relation between the President and Attorney
General will in the end depend on the ethical and political understandings held by
each of them. Misbehavior by a President and Attorney General can generally be
corrected through the political process, as happened with President Nixon and his
Attorneys General. Dismay at improper relations may lead us to wish for more
precise rules.
Character and ability matter, and perhaps the most important step in the
President–Attorney General relation is the selection. As ethicist Monroe Freedman
has written, “the Attorney General should be more than a highly proficient hired
gun.”40 Attorney General Robert Jackson’s speech about the qualities we should
seek in a federal prosecutor applies as well to qualities to seek in an Attorney
General:
The qualities of a good prosecutor are as elusive and as impossible to
define as those which mark a gentleman. And those who need to be told
would not understand it anyway. A sensitiveness to fair play and
38. MEADOR, supra note 3, at 42.
39. FTC v. Claire Furnace Co., 274 U.S. 160, 174 (1927).
40. Monroe Freedman, Zoe Baird’s Rap Sheet, LEGAL TIMES, Feb. 1, 1993.

79

2021 / My Experiences with President–Attorney General Relationships
sportsmanship is perhaps the best protection against the abuse of power,
and the citizen’s safety lies in the prosecutor who tempers zeal with human
kindness, who seeks truth and not victims, who serves the law and not
factional purposes, and who approaches his task with humility.41
Some Presidents have had close prior relations with their Attorneys General.
Robert Kennedy was the President’s brother; William French Smith was President
Reagan’s personal lawyer; Griffin Bell was President Carter’s hunting companion;
John Mitchell was President Nixon’s law partner and campaign manager. In the
cases described above, Smith and Mitchell may have allowed their relationship
with the President to influence them to ignore law and normal procedures.42 The
results were damaging to the credibility of the Department of Justice. But Kennedy
and Bell seem not to have allowed their relations with the President to dull their
legal and ethical judgment.
Still, it would seem preferable for the President and Attorney General to stand
at arm’s length, with the President providing general policy guidance and leaving
the Attorney General to carry out policy consistent with their legal judgment. This
was the relation between President Ford and Attorney General Levi, and it resulted
in restoration of both internal morale and external reputation of the Department of
Justice.43 No wonder, then, that as Merrick Garland assumed his duties as President
Biden’s attorney general in the wake of his predecessor’s morale wrecking regime,
he vowed to follow in Levi’s footsteps: “The only way we can succeed and retain
the trust of the American people is to adhere to the norms that have become part
of the DNA of every Justice Department employee since Edward Levi’s stint as
the first post-Watergate Attorney General.”44
Garland’s speech was lofty. More pragmatically, President Kennedy’s advisor,
Theodore Sorenson, testified in the wake of Watergate, “We should expect a
certain amount of partisan advocacy, not judicial judgment, from our Attorneys
General as we do from ordinary lawyers. But quality members of the bar, even
while serving as partisan advocates, can and should and generally do retain a

41.
Robert H. Jackson, The Federal Prosecutor, ROBERT H. JACKSON CTR.,
https://www.roberthjackson.org/speech-and-writing/the-federal-prosecutor/ (last visited Aug. 25, 2021) (on file
with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (delivering his address at the Conference of United States
Attorneys, Washington, D.C., April 1, 1940).
42. But see Gerald Caplan, The Making of the Attorney General: John Mitchell and the Crimes of
Watergate Reconsidered, 41 MCGEORGE L. REV. 311, 334 (2010) (“Nixon more than once wished for an Attorney
General who was more accommodating . . . .”).
43. Neil A. Lewis, Edward H. Levi, Attorney General Credited With Restoring Order After Watergate,
Dies at 88, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 2000, at C25 (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (indicating
that Senator Edward M. Kennedy, a Democrat, praised him when Levi left the department of justice, saying he
“entered office under the most difficult and trying circumstances, yet he leaves a department once again
characterized by integrity, intellectual honesty and commitment to equal justice”).
44. U.S. Attorney General Merrick Garland’s Remarks to Department of Justice, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST.
(Mar. 11, 2021), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-merrick-garland-addresses-115000-empl
oyees-department-justice-his-first (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review).
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certain and necessary degree of independence from their clients; and the same
should be true of the Attorney General. . . .”45

45. Removing Politics from the Administration of Justice: Hearings on S. 2803 and S. 2978 Before the
Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1974) (including
statement of Theodore Sorensen, Former Special Counsel to President Kennedy).
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